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ABSTRACT

Immigration scholars and advocates frequently criticize our immigration system for imposing severe penalties akin to (or worse than)
those in the criminal justice system-such as prolonged detention and
permanent exile from the United States-without providing sufficient
procedural protections to minimize enforcement errors. Yet there has
been relatively little scholarship examining the frequency of errors in
immigration enforcement and identifying recurring causes of those errors, in part because the data is hard to come by. This Article begins by
canvassing some of the publicly available data on enforcement errors,
which reveal that such mistakes occur too frequently to be dismissed as
flukes. Although the data is too limited to draw any definitive conclusions as to the causes of such errors, it appears that some errors occur
because low-level officials are asked to administer complex and ambiguous immigration laws quickly and with little training or oversight. This
Article concludes by calling for immigration reform advocates to gather
more information about wrongful deportations, following the lead of the
Innocence Project, which has used data from DNA exonerations to raise
public awareness of wrongful convictions and to advocate for additional
procedural protections in the criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration law has morphed from a civil to a quasi-criminal
system, and yet it has failed to incorporate the procedural protections that
accompany enforcement of criminal law. As immigration scholars have
observed, criminal law and immigration law are now in a symbiotic relationship: many criminal convictions trigger serious immigration consequences, and many violations of immigration law are prosecuted as
crimes.' Furthermore, the consequences of immigration violations, such
as prolonged detention and removal from the United States, are as severe, if not more so, than those for violating criminal law.2 Yet many of
the procedural protections available in the criminal justice system to prevent wrongful convictions are absent from immigration enforcement. 3 As
1. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ("To deport [an alien] .... may
result . . in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living." (citation omitted)).
3. See, eg., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints. The Explosion of Targeted Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 372 (2014) (noting that the procedural protections
available in the criminal justice system could reduce errors in immigration enforcement); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469, 469 (2007).
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Professor Stephen Legomsky put it, immigration law has "absorb[ed] the
theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities associated with criminal
enforcement," but has thus far "explicitly reject[ed] the procedural ingredients of criminal adjudication," leaving "noncitizens in deportation proceedings exposed to large risks of error when the personal stakes are

high."4
This Article argues that it is time to determine whether accuracy is
in fact a significant problem in immigration enforcement and, if so,
whether additional procedural protections could prevent some of these
errors from occurring. The Article is inspired in part by the work of Professor Brandon Garrett, who uncovered systemic errors in the criminal
justice system by closely studying the records of 250 innocent people
exonerated by DNA testing. Before the advent of DNA testing, many
assumed that wrongful convictions were the rare exception.5 As Garrett
explained in his book, Convicting the Innocent, "DNA exonerations have
changed the face of criminal justice in the United States by revealing that
wrongful convictions do occur and, in the process, altering how judges,
lawyers, legislators, the public, and scholars perceive the system's accuracy."6 Garrett studied the records of many of the 250 exonerees' judicial
proceedings to determine whether these cases were rare exceptions in an
otherwise healthy system or, alternatively, evidence of systemic failure.7
He concluded that they demonstrated the latter after identifying several
recurring problems-including "contaminated" confessions, eyewitness
misidentification, unreliable informants, and inadequate representationthat resulted in wrongful conviction in these cases.8 And he observed that
similar errors must have resulted in the wrongful conviction of many
who still languish in prison-or worse, who have been executedbecause they cannot be exonerated after the fact through a definitive
mechanism such as DNA testing.9 Professor Garrett concluded by sug-

4.
Legomsky, supra note 3. Procedural protections serve many values in addition to ensuring
accurate outcomes, such as protecting personal privacy and dignity, and ensuring government accountability. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-50
(1976). However, this Article will focus on benefits of added procedural protections to guard against
errors in decision making.
5.
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Go WRONG 5 (2011).
6.
Id at 6; see also Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of
Criminal Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of
System Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 439 (2007) ("Accumulating proof that wrongful convictions occur, and that they occur with a frequency that was not previously anticipated, has resulted in
more resources being devoted to discovering cases involving factually innocent defendants and in
increased academic interest in the extent and causes of wrongful convictions; in turn, system actors
have become increasingly aware of the problems and dangers of convicting innocent defendants.").
7.
GARRETT, supra note 5, at 6-7.

8.
9.

Id. at 8.
Id.
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gesting reforms that would prevent such errors from tainting future proceedings.10
It is time to conduct a similar study of the "wrongfully deported."
Indeed, the need is even greater in the immigration context, not only because the penalties imposed are so high, but also because the current
procedural protections are so low. As the Supreme Court explained in
Mathews v. Eldridge," courts must balance the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual's liberty against the burden on the government
of providing additional procedural protections to lessen that risk.1 2 Accordingly, if there are systemic problems in the accuracy of immigrationrelated detention and removal, it is time to determine why those mistakes
occur and whether they can be prevented.13
Unfortunately, however, data on immigration enforcement errors is
hard to come by. Although the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) both publish
statistics on immigration enforcement, they do not keep track of cases in
which the government is found to have erred in targeting individuals for
removal. For example, although immigration scholars and advocates
have shown that U.S. citizens are detained and even deported by immigration officials with surprising frequency, the U.S. government maintains no publicly available statistics tracking that problem.1 4 Nor does the
government appear to record how often it mistakenly bars entry into the
United States or erroneously seeks to remove noncitizens lawfully permitted to reside in the United States.' 5 Thus, this Article cannot comprehensively analyze immigration enforcement errors, but rather can only
review some of the limited data on enforcement errors and describe avenues for future research of this question.
Part I of this Article examines cases in which the government mistakenly concluded that an individual was not legally entitled to be in the
United States, leading to the exclusion, detention, or removal of that individual. This Article uses data from the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC), EOIR's annual statistics, advocacy reports, as
well as Westlaw and other publicly available databases, to determine the

10.
11.
12.

Id. at 12-13.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id at 321.

&

13.
Some criminal defense lawyers have critiqued the Innocence Project as unduly focused on
wrongful convictions, detracting attention from other needed reforms of the criminal justice system,
such as ensuring that the punishment fits the crime. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty
Project: A CriminalDefense Lawyer's Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L.

Soc. CHANGE 315, 324 (2009-2010). That critique is well-taken, and in this Article I do not mean to
suggest that immigration reform efforts should myopically focus on avoiding mistakes in immigration enforcement at the cost of all potential areas for reform.
14.
Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting US. Citizens

as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 606, 618-20 (2011).
15.
See id. at 629-32.
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frequency of such errors, and provides several examples to illustrate the
problem.
Part II then asks what we can learn from the mistakes catalogued in
Part I. A number of themes emerge, many of which are similar to the
recurring errors that have led to wrongful convictions in the criminal
justice system. Coerced confessions, lack of legal representation, and
mental illness all appear to play an outsized role in leading immigration
officials to detain, exclude, and remove those legally entitled to be in the
United States. But some immigration enforcement errors are caused by a
problem unique to immigration law: the complexity of immigration law
itself. Byzantine immigration laws and regulations appear to confound
not only the targets of immigration enforcement but also the low-level
(and sometimes not-so-low-level) officials tasked with enforcing the
laws. The laws that control who is a U.S. citizen, who is legally permitted to enter and remain in the United States, and what types of post-entry
conduct justify removal take up hundreds of pages of the U.S. Code and
the Federal Reporter and are often ambiguous and confusing. Yet those
who administer such laws often must do so quickly, with little opportunity to consult and reflect, and with a bureaucratic rigidity that can lead to
terrible consequences for those legally entitled to be in the United States.
In short, it appears that the complexity of our immigration system defeats
even the supposed experts who administer it.
Part III lays out a framework for gathering and analyzing the data
on immigration enforcement errors going forward. Eliminating all errors
from any enforcement system is impossible; enforcing the law requires a
willingness to accept that occasionally an innocent party will be targeted
in error. Nonetheless, a reasonable enforcement system must ensure
that the costs of the errors do not outweigh the benefits of enforcement,
and this calculation can only be made with a clearer picture than we have
today about the frequency and causes of immigration enforcement errors.
I. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ERRORS
Part A describes the types of enforcement errors that are the focus
of this Article, and Part B canvasses the existing data regarding the frequency of such errors.
A. Enforcement Errors
This Article is focused on errors in which the government detains,
excludes, or removes individuals who it mistakenly concludes are not
16.
See, e.g., Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 87 (2008) (statement of Rep. Steven King, Member,
H. Subcomm. On Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law),

available

at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 10hhrg40742/pdf/CHRG- I 10hhrg40742.pdf

(suggesting that immigration enforcement will always produce some errors).
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entitled to be in the United States. For example, the government errs
when it seeks to remove a U.S. citizen, or a noncitizen with lawful status
whom the government miscategorizes as lacking legal status, and when it
denies admission to those legally entitled to enter the United States.' 7
Below are five examples of the types of classification errors that are
the focus of this Article. They were chosen for the purely practical reason that they were publicly available-that is, descriptions of these errors
can be found in newspapers, law review articles, court documents, and
reports by advocacy groups. Although these individual cases cannot be
presumed to represent a larger sample, they do provide concrete examples of the types of mistakes that should be subject to further research
and analysis to determine the factors that lead to immigration enforcement errors.
1. Pedro Guzman
Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen who was born in California, was removed to Mexico after an employee in the Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Office mistakenly concluded that Guzman was a Mexican national.' 8
Guzman was arrested for trespassing after he entered a private airport
and tried to board an airplane.1 9 He pled guilty and was sentenced to 120
days in jail but was deported to Mexico before he completed his sentence.20 Although immigration officials subsequently conceded their mistake, they insisted Guzman told them he was born in Mexico and was not
authorized to be in the United States and that he signed documents in
which he agreed to be returned to Mexico. Guzman's attorneys responded that he never told officials he was born in Mexico and that documents, such as the incident report filed after the arrest, stated Guzman
was a U.S. citizen.22 They also noted that the Sheriffs Office knew
Guzman complained of hearing voices and was taking antipsychotic
medication, and thus even if Guzman reported he was a noncitizen they
should have known not to rely on those statements exclusively when
deciding whether to deport him from the United States.2 3

17.
These types of classification errors are not the only mistakes that the government can
make when enforcing immigration law. For example, the government can mistakenly conclude that a
noncitizen is ineligible for discretionary relief, denying the noncitizen a remedy that is legally available. However, the purpose of this Article is not to canvass every type of error that can occur in
immigration enforcement, but rather to set out a few types of clear-cut errors that can then be used to
determine whether there are systemic problems with accuracy in immigration enforcement.

18.

Paloma Esquivel, Suit Filed Over Man's DeportationOrdeal, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008),

http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/28/local/me-guzman28.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
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2. Wilfredo Garza
Wilfredo Garza was born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen father and a
Mexican mother.2 4 Garza's father divorced his mother shortly after he
was born, and when Garza was eight years old he went to live with his
father in the United States. 25 Over the next twenty-five years, ICE officers repeatedly deported Garza to Mexico, and Garza repeatedly surreptitiously reentered the United States by swimming across the Rio Grande.
It was not until Garza was in his thirties that he learned he had acquired
U.S. citizenship from his father, who had lived in the United States a
sufficient number of years to automatically bestow citizenship on his
son.26 Garza petitioned the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) to acknowledge his citizenship, but while that petition
was pending he was picked up again and charged with illegal re-entry--a
27
felony that could have subjected him to two years in prison. Garza insisted he was a U.S. citizen and the charges were dropped. Nonetheless,
he was removed once again from the United States over his protests that
he was a U.S. citizen and without an opportunity to be heard by an immigration judge.28 Eventually USCIS recognized his claim to citizenship,
but only after he had spent months in jail and had been removed from the
United States on four separate occasions.29
3. Roberto Lopez-Gutierrez
Roberto Lopez-Gutierrez, a Mexican citizen, was kidnapped in
Mexico and held for ransom near the U.S.-Mexico border. 30 He escaped
and was arrested by the U.S. Customs and Board Protection (CBP)."' The
CBP officer asked if he was afraid of returning to Mexico, as the officer
was required to do by law.32 Lopez-Gutierrez explained he was afraid of
his kidnappers.33 Nonetheless, the CBP officer wrote down that LopezGutierrez was not afraid, and Lopez-Gutierrez was prosecuted for illegal
entry. 34 In subsequent court proceedings, the CBP officer explained she
recorded that he had no fear of returning because "he was afraid of kidnappers, not of government persecution." 3 5 The officer further testified
she was not trained in asylum law and that she believed if a person was
24.

12, 2006,
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Lauren Etter, Immigration Twist Gives a Laborer a Fresh Beginning, WALL ST. J. (May

12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI 14739948011750992.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

30.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE
at
ACLU
REPORT],
available
37
(2014)
[hereinafter
COURTROOM
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/1 20214-expeditedremoval_0.pdf.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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afraid of private individuals and not the government, that person had no
right to seek asylum in the United States.36 For that reason, she erroneously assumed Lopez-Gutierrez was not eligible for asylum, and so she
did not refer him to an interview with an asylum officer to determine if
he had a credible fear of returning to Mexico.37

4. Ian McEwan
Award-winning British author Ian McEwan was denied admission
to the United States as he tried to board an airplane from Vancouver,
British Columbia to Seattle, Washington on March 30, 2004.38 After
McEwan informed CBP officers in the Vancouver airport that he would
be paid thousands of dollars in honoraria for giving a few speeches in the
United States, the officers erroneously concluded he could not enter the
United States on a tourist visa, detained him for four hours for questioning, and then stamped his passport "Refused Admittance." 39 McEwan
spent the night in Vancouver, and he was only permitted to enter the
United States the next day after immigration lawyers, consular officers,
and members of Congress all got involved. 40 A few weeks later he received a rare letter of apology from the United States Customs and Border Patrol admitting the denial of entry had been an "error[]" and promising that it would not impact his future attempts to enter the United
States.4 1
5. Francisco N.G.
Francisco N.G. and his mother had both been granted U visas 4 2 after
they testified against his abusive father, and thus Francisco was legally
living and working in the United States.43 In 2014, Francisco was driving
himself and some of his coworkers to work when he was pulled over by
the police for having an expired registration sticker on his truck." The
police then called ICE, who arrested all the occupants of the truck.45
36.
37.

Id. at 37-38.
Id.

38.
John Marshall, British Author Detained 24 Hours at Border, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (Mar. 31, 2004, 9:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/ae/books/article/British-author-

detained-24-hours-at-border- 1141079.php.
39.
Id.
40.
See id.
Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts Briefing, U.S. Apologizes to McEwan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
41.
(quoting statement by The
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/22/books/arts-briefing.htm
Associated Press).
42.
U visas are available to noncitizens, including undocumented immigrants, who have been
the victim of a crime and are willing to help in the investigation and prosecution of that crime. Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-criminalactivity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last updated Jan. 9,

2014); see also Immigration and Nationality Act
43.

ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 52.

44.
45.

Id.
Id.

§

101, 8 U.S.C.

§

1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
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Francisco was interrogated by several different ICE officers, one of
whom threw away his U visa ID and denied that he had lawful status to
46
remain in the United States.46 ICE officers then told Francisco that some
of the occupants of his car had been undocumented immigrants, and he
would be charged with smuggling.47 The next day Francisco was deported to Piedras Negras, Mexico.48 He was only able to return to the United
States after finding a lawyer who accompanied him to the border to explain the situation, and then spending several days in immigration detention while immigration authorities verified his status.49
B. The Frequency oflmmigrationEnforcement Errors
Are the examples of enforcement errors described in Part I the type
of mistakes that can occasionally occur in even the most carefully managed large-scale criminal or civil enforcement system, or are they evidence of systemic failures that require systemic reform? This Part examines data on immigration enforcement errors to try to determine the
scope of the problem. Although the available data is too limited to provide a comprehensive assessment of the error rate in immigration enforcement, it does suggest that errors occur too frequently to be dismissed as flukes.
1. Detention and Deportation of U.S. Citizens
As Professor Jacqueline Stevens has shown, a surprising number of
citizens are erroneously detained and sometimes even deported.50 Based
on her research, Professor Stevens estimates that approximately 1% to
1.5% of the persons detained by ICE at any given time are U.S. citizens
and that U.S. citizens constitute approximately .5% of the persons deported by ICE each year.51 The percentages are not large, but they add up
to approximately 4,000 U.S. citizens each year who are erroneously
caught up in the immigration enforcement system.52 In addition, ICE
issued 834 detainers against U.S. citizens between FY 2008 and FY
2012, which led to U.S. citizens being held in custody for longer than
they would have otherwise because ICE erroneously believed they had
53
violated immigration laws.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 53.
Id
Id
Id at 52-53.

Professor Stevens estimates that approximately 1% of all persons detained by U.S. Immi50.
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are U.S. citizens at any given time. Stevens, supranote 14,
at 629. Part II.B discusses the frequency of immigration enforcement errors in more detail.

51.

Id at 629, 632.

See id. at 608 ("Recent data suggests that in 2010 well over 4,000 U.S. citizens were
52.
detained or deported as aliens, raising the total since 2003 to more than 20,000 . . . .").
53.
ICE Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents, TRAC REPORTS,
INC. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/3 11/.
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The detention and deportation of U.S. citizens is not the only type
of immigration enforcement error, however. As catalogued in Part I.A.,
immigration officials can also err by deporting noncitizens legally entitled to remain in the United States and by excluding noncitizens legally
entitled to enter. Assuming immigration officials err with similar frequency when they wrongfully detain and remove noncitizens, then the
actual error rate in immigration enforcement for these types of categorical errors is sure to be much higher. Furthermore, ICE may also erroneously deny noncitizens discretionary relief-for example, by mistakenly
asserting they are not eligible for cancellation of removal. Such errors are
even harder to detect and to study, but presumably they will further contribute to the overall ICE error rate. In short, if ICE is erroneously detaining and deporting 4,000 U.S. citizens each year, it seems reasonable to
assume that thousands of noncitizens are also mistakenly excluded, detained, and deported.
2. Termination of Removal Cases
Another important data point regarding ICE enforcement errors
comes from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC),
which uses Freedom of Information Act requests to gather data regarding
ICE's enforcement record before the immigration courts.5 4 In 2010,
TRAC noted that in a "significant and increasing" number of cases, immigration courts were rejecting ICE's attempts to have noncitizens removed from the United States. ICE's failure rate for the last three
months of fiscal year 2010 was 31%, which is significantly higher than
the 25% of cases in which it failed to obtain a removal order in Fiscal
56
Years 2004 through 2009. In approximately 15% of these cases, the
immigration judge granted affirmative relief from removal after a finding
of removability, and so it does not appear that ICE committed an error in
targeting the noncitizen for removal. 57 But approximately 12% of cases
in the last three months of fiscal year 2010 were terminated by immigra54.
55.

Id.
ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRAC REPORTS, INC. (Nov. 9, 2010),

http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/. Department of Justice statistics reveal that in FY 2013,
immigration judges terminated 15.4% of all the cases before them on the ground that ICE was unable to sustain the charges, permitting 24,453 people in removal proceedings to remain in the United
States in their original status. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2-C3 (2014) [hereinafter FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK],
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyl3syb.pdf.
Immigration judges are permitted to terminate a proceeding to allow a noncitizen to pursue a naturalization application upon the showing of compelling humanitarian circumstances, or if

evidence shows the government has not proved removability. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1239.2(f)

(2004). The

immigration judge does not have the authority to terminate proceedings for any other reason. See
Wong 13 1. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971). Terminations do not include administrative closures
or the granting of affirmative relief, which cannot be considered clear enforcement mistakes by ICE
even though these rulings also permit the targets of immigration enforcement to remain in the United
States. See ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, supra.
ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, supra note 55.
56.

57.

See id
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tion judges after finding no grounds for removal, an increase from the
approximately 5% to 7% of cases terminated for such reason from 1999
through 2005.
Significantly, the trend that TRAC identified in 2010 has continued,
as EOIR's own statistics show. EOIR's FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook
states that only 6.4% of cases were terminated in 2009, either because the
charges were not sustained or because the noncitizen established eligibility for naturalization.59 That number jumped up to 9.6% in 2010, 10.1%
in 2001, 11.5% in 2012, and was 13.3% in 2 013.6 In 2013 alone, 19,107
cases that came before an immigration judge for removal were terminated, allowing the target to remain in the United States in the status they
held before removal proceedings began. 61
However, it is not clear that in all of these cases ICE has committed
the type of enforcement errors described in Part I. A case may be terminated by an immigration judge for several reasons, not all of which are
due to targeting the wrong person for removal. For example, if the immigration court found that ICE obtained evidence of alienage through egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment, then that evidence will be
excluded and the case terminated even though the individual targeted for
removal was not in fact legally permitted to stay in the United States.62
Likewise, a case may be terminated because ICE chose to grant prosecutonal discretion for humanitarian reasons. Nonetheless, the data supports the conclusion that ICE cannot find evidence to support removal
for a significant percentage of those whom it brings before an immigration judge, which further suggests that ICE errs in selecting targets for
removal.
3. Errors in Summary Removals
EOIR's statistics, described above, relate only to the small percentage of removal cases brought before an immigration judge. Most removals in the United States occur through a streamlined removal procedure
in which there is no opportunity for review of the initial removal decision
58.
See id In the other cases in which ICE failed to obtain a removal order, the target of
removal obtained affirmative relief, or the case was dismissed for another, unspecified reason. See
id. at fig. I (showing removal order requests that were not granted by immigration courts).
59.
FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 55, at C2.

60.

Id

Id. Furthermore, immigration judges reject ICE's request for a removal order in close to
61.
50% of cases, which further suggests that ICE is targeting the wrong individuals for removal. See
ICE Targeting: Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by Immigration Judge Through June 2015,
TRAC
REPORTS,
INC.,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/courtbacklog/apprepoutcome leave.php (last visited Mar.
29, 2015); see also Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings,
89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 36 (2014) (observing that ICE's high rate of failure in obtaining removal orders
suggests that it is seeking to remove individuals with a legal right to remain in the United States).
See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51
62.

(1984).
63.

See Stevens, supranote 14, at 656.
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by an immigration judge. In 2013, 83% of removals were carried out by
immigration officials making unilateral decisions that were not subject to
judicial review.6 In such summary removals, the decision is made by
immigration officials, often in a matter of hours, and the individual usually has no opportunity for a hearing before an immigration judge. 65 if
immigration enforcement officials are consistently targeting for removal
those who are entitled to stay in the United States-as the data regarding
terminations of removal cases described in Part I.B.2 suggests may be
the case-then those types of errors are likely occurring at an even higher rate in the context of summary removals.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recently published a
report entitled American Exile: Rapid Deportations that Bypass the
Courtroom, examining 136 cases of individuals removed from the United
States through summary removal procedures "such as expedited removal,
voluntary return, administrative removal, or a stipulated order of removal." 66 Although the ACLU Report was not exclusively focused on erroneous deportations, it nonetheless provided numerous examples of cases
in which immigration officials mistakenly deported U.S. citizens and
noncitizens with valid visas.67 In several of those cases-such as that of
Francisco N.G., described in Part I.A-the individuals involved explicitly informed immigration officials they were legally entitled to remain in
the United States and yet were deported without a hearing.
Data compiled by the American Immigration Lawyers Association's
(AILA) and the American Immigration Council's (AIC) Artesia Pro Bono Project provides further evidence of immigration enforcement errors
68
in these types of summary removal proceedings.
In the summer of
2014, unusually high numbers of women and young children crossed the
69
southwest border into the United States, many of whom sought asylum.
In June of 2014, the U.S. government began to house some of these
women and children at a family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico-a small town in the New Mexico desert that is hundreds of miles
from the nearest major metropolitan area.70 As required by law, those
women who sought asylum were granted interviews with asylum officers

64.
JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 2-3, tbl.7 (2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/oisenforcement ar 2013.pdf.
65.
See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH:
DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA 65-67 (2012) (describing summary removal procedures).
66.
ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 9.

67.

See id. at 44-66.

68.
Stephen
Manning,
Ending
Artesia,
INNOVATION
LAW
https://innovationlawlab.org/2014/12/20/the-artesia-report/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).

69.
70.

Id.
Id.
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to determine if they had a credible fear of persecution in their home
-71
countries.
Initially, almost none of the women were represented by lawyers
before or during these interviews and approximately 60% of the women
were found not to have credible fear and were deported shortly thereafter.7 2 For the first month, no one was released from the detention facility
aside from those who were deported. Starting in July 2014, AILA and
AIC organized pro bono representation for these families, putting volunteer attorneys on the ground at the detention facility each week to interview and prepare the women to seek asylum, as well as to obtain bonds
for those who passed their credible fear interviews and were scheduled
for asylum hearings.74 Shortly thereafter, the approval rate for credible
fear interviews shot up from only 38% for the unrepresented women to
near 100% for those who had access to counsel.75 Thus far, approximately 50% of the detainees represented by AILA have been released from
the facility on bond,76 and AILA attorneys have won fourteen of the fifteen asylum cases that have gone to trial.77
In light of these statistics, it seems likely at least some of the unrepresented detainees who were found not to have a credible fear of persecution and returned immediately to their home countries were actually entitled to asylum in the United States. That nearly 100% of the women and
young children who received legal assistance were able to show credible
fear meriting an asylum hearing strongly suggests some of the 60% who
were found not to have credible fear were in fact eligible to seek asylum.78 Moreover, similar problems have been reported in the past. In
2005, the bipartisan United States Commission on International Religious Freedom also found that immigration officials failed to properly
71.
72.
73.

Id
Id
Id.

74.
See id. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I spent a week at the detention
facility in Artesia, New Mexico supervising students in American University's Immigrant Justice
Clinic who represented the detainees.

75.

See id.

76.
E-mail from Vanessa Sischo, Coordinator, Artesia Pro Bono Project, to author (Nov. 16,
2014) (quoting Stephen Manning) (on file with author). At least one of the detainees released in
December was a U.S. citizen-a fact discovered by AILA volunteers after the detainee told them
that her mother was a citizen who had lived for the requisite amount of time in the United States, and
thus that she had automatically derived U.S. citizenship upon birth. After a meeting with ICE officials at which AILA volunteers provided them with evidence of this fact, the detainee was released
two hours later. See E-mail from Maria Andrade, to author (Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with author).
77.
Manning, supra note 68.
78.
A skeptic might argue that lawyers can manipulate the system on behalf of their clients
because the credible fear standard is both subjective and vague. But as anyone who attends a credible fear interview knows, the lawyer plays only a very minor role at the interview, usually speaking
only very briefly, after the client has been interviewed for several hours. Even well-prepared clients
will not be able to demonstrate a credible fear of persecution without being able to cite specific
events in their own lives that suggest they have reason to fear return to their home country. In short,
lawyers can help those with genuine fear make their case to an asylum officer, but cannot manufacture a factual basis for having such a fear for their clients.
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screen for asylum claims and removed those who had expressed a credible fear of persecution. 79 Thus, the evidence suggests that noncitizens
with meritorious asylum claims are deported with surprising frequency.
4. Conclusion
The U.S. government does not publicly report how often it discovers that it detained or deported a person in error. Nor does it record why
removal cases are terminated, or why some individuals are readmitted to
the United States after deportation, or why others are permitted to enter
after a previous finding of inadmissibility. In short, the government does
not keep records of its mistakes. Although the currently available data
cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the error rate in immigration
enforcement, it does suggest errors are too frequent to be dismissed as
rare outliers. If the United States is erroneously deporting thousands of
people a year, as would seem to be the case, it is time to address systemic
problems in the accuracy of immigration enforcement.
II. SOURCES OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ERRORS
The data described in Part I regarding wrongful detention and deportation is incomplete, and thus cannot provide any definitive answers
about the causes of such errors. Nonetheless, the data suggests there are
recurring problems in immigration enforcement worthy of closer study
and further research. Some of these errors mirror those observed in the
criminal system, while others appear to be unique to the problem of allowing immigration officials to interpret and enforce complex and ambiguous immigration statutes and regulations without outside review.
A.

"CrImmigration"Errors

Not surprisingly, immigration enforcement errors appear to be
caused by the same sorts of mistakes that lead to wrongful convictions in
the criminal justice system. For example, coerced confessions appear to
be a problem in both systems. Professor Garrett's analysis of 250 cases
in which convicted felons were exonerated through DNA evidence
demonstrates that false confessions-often made after hours of questioning, intimidation, and threats-are a significant source of error in the
criminal justice system.80 Likewise, those who were removed from the
United States despite having a legal right to remain in the country are
often subject to lengthy interrogations and end up signing documents
agreeing to their own removal.81 Professor Stevens's research reveals
79.
U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4-5 (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/specialreports/report-asylum-seekers-in-expedited-removal.
80.
GARRETT, supra note 5, at 5-8.

81.

See, e.g., Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2009) (excluding a nonciti-

zen's confession that he violated immigration laws because it had been made after many hours of
interrogation over the course of a single night, and thus was involuntary and unreliable).
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that a significant percentage of U.S. citizens who are wrongly detained
and deported falsely "confess" to being undocumented immigrants after
82
interrogation by immigration officials. Another immigration advocate
observed that "very difficult detention conditions create a strong incentive to agree to any option that will end the detention quickly, and provides a strong disincentive to exercising rights of appeal, which can
stretch a period of detention out for months longer."83
Intellectual disabilities and mental illness are also factors that increase the error rate in both the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems. As many immigration advocacy groups have noted,
those with such disabilities are particularly likely to be the victims of
enforcement errors. 84 The deportation of Pedro Guzman provides an example of the problem. Guzman reported hearing voices and was on antipsychotic medication, which may have led him to sign papers conceding
to his deportability, and which certainly hurt his ability to convince immigration officials that he was in fact a U.S. citizen.85 Mentally impaired
individuals may not be able to gather evidence and make a compelling
argument about their legal right to remain in the United States, and thus
they are at the mercy of immigration officials' willingness to investigate
the matter for them.86 And yet immigration officials lack the capacity,
and possibly the incentive, to do so.
Inadequate representation also leads to errors in both the criminal
and immigration systems. In the criminal justice system, defendants have
a right to counsel provided by the government when charged with felonies. All too often, however, indigent defense lawyers are overworked,
or simply unprepared, to defend their clients against serious charges.88
Moreover, criminal defendants have no right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases, and thus wrongful convictions appear even more likely in that
context. 89 Likewise, there is no constitutional right to government-funded

82.
See Stevens, supra note 14, at 629-32.
83.
Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (footnote omitted) (quoting the manuscript at 28).
84.
See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 48 ("[I]ndividuals with mental disabilities may
be at particular risk of erroneous deportation given the complexity of immigration law, the continued
absence of appointed counsel in all immigration proceedings, and (in the absence of a lawyer) the
reliance on a person's own statements and admissions as the primary evidence.").
85.
Esquivel, supranote 18.
86.
See ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 48-49.

87.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).

88.
See GARRETT, supra note 5, at 165-67 (stating that "[p]oor lawyering appears to have
played a crucial role in these exonerees' cases," although also noting the degree to which inadequate
representation led to the wrongful convictions is hard to determine).
89.
See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisisfor Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1808 (2013). Errors in the criminal justice system produce errors in the
immigration system, and vice versa. If a U.S. citizen is erroneously removed from the United States,
that citizen might subsequently be prosecuted for illegal re-entry when he tries to come back to the
United States-as happened to Wilfredo Garza. See Etter, supra note 24. Or if a noncitizen is mistakenly convicted of a misdemeanor shoplifting offense, he might be deported as a result. Thus, the
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counsel in removal proceedings, even when the target of removal is a
child or is mentally disabled. 90 Immigration enforcement errors almost
always occur in cases in which the individual lacks legal representation,
as the cases described in Part L.A show, and it is only with the assistance
of counsel that the wrongfully deported are able to find their way back
into the United States.91 The striking statistics from AILA's Artesia Pro
Bono Project illustrate the difference that counsel can make: although
approximately 60% of the women without legal representation were
found not to have a credible fear of persecution, almost 100% who benefitted from legal representation met that standard and were allowed to
remain in the United States while they pursued their asylum claims.92
B. ImmigrationLaw's Complexity as a Causal Factor
Although some of the causes of errors in immigration enforcement
are similar to those in the criminal justice system, others are due to factors unique to immigration law, such as the fact that low-level officials
are expected to interpret and apply a complex body of laws and regulations without review or oversight.
In most criminal cases, whether the defendant is guilty of a crime is
a straightforward question of fact, even if there is some ambiguity regarding the proper charge and sentence for that crime. 93 And in most
criminal cases, the decision whether to charge someone with a crime is
made by a lawyer, and a conviction or plea bargain is reviewed by a
judge.94 In contrast, many important questions in immigration law turn
on complex statutes and regulations that are not easily interpreted even
by experienced lawyers. For example, whether a legal permanent resident has committed a crime that renders him removable is a topic that
takes up thousands of pages in casebooks, treaties, and practitioners'
guides. 95 Admissibility also can sometimes be difficult to determine, as
evidenced by the experience of author Ian McEwan. 9 6 Even the basic
question of whether an individual is a U.S. citizen can get complicated
error rate of one system can come with twice the costs to the victim of that error. See Cade, supra, at

1808-09.
90.
See Complaint at 2, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2014) (filing
class action lawsuit challenging government's failure to provide children in asylum proceedings with
counsel as a violation of due process).
91.
See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptional-

ism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2022 (2013) ("The U.S. citizen deportation cases that have come to light
provide powerful examples of the difference that access to counsel makes, due to the growing number of cases in which those who have been misclassified as noncitizens within removal proceedings
later prevail on citizenship claims when prosecuted for illegal reentry.").
92.
See MANNING, supra note 68.
93.
See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA 55-61 (1993).

94.

See id. at 50-52.

95.
See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRiGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 548-88 (5th ed. 2009).
96.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing error that led to CBP officials deny
Ian McEwan entry into the United States).
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quickly when the individual is born abroad and acquires citizenship from
a U.S. citizen parent. In all of these cases, it is not just the facts that may
be hard to ascertain, it is the law itself.
For example, at first glance McEwan's travails appear to be the result of negligence by the low-level CBP officials who prevented him
from entering the United States after learning he would receive honoraria
for his speaking engagements. But in fact honoraria are a gray area in
U.S. immigration law. Although the law clearly allows visiting foreign
artists and academics appearing before educational and non-profit groups
to accept honoraria without first obtaining a work visa, 98 there are no
regulations to guide field officers who are trying to distinguish permissible honoraria from impermissible payment for labor in the United States,
leading to inconsistent admission standards and general confusion. Representative Jim McDermott, who helped to resolve McEwan's predicament, explained that his office handles these types of border situations on
a daily basis, and he told the press that "this happens more often than
most people think." 99
Similarly, Wilfredo Garza only learned that he was a U.S. citizen
after his brother's lawyer determined their father had resided in the United States for a sufficient number of years to automatically transmit citizenship to his children.100 The laws regarding acquisition of citizenship
are complex and have changed frequently, requiring lawyers to consult
lengthy charts to determine the standards in place at the time their clients
0
were born.o'
Garza was removed from the United States four times, and
it apparently never occurred to immigration officials to inquire about his
parents' citizenship. But even if they had known of Garza's U.S. citizen
father, these officials would have had difficulty determining whether
Garza was therefore a citizen himself.
The complexity of immigration law is a particular problem when
admission or removal decisions are made through streamlined removal
procedures, which require only that two enforcement officers agree that

97.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing error that led to CBP officials deny
Ian McEwan entry into the United States).

98.

Immigration and Nationality Act

§ 212,

8 U.S.C.

§

Il82(q) (2013) ("Any alien admitted

under section 101 l(a)(15)(B) of this title may accept an honorarium payment and associated incidental expenses for a usual academic activity or activities (lasting not longer than 9 days at any
single institution), as defined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Education, if such payment is offered by an institution or organization described in subsection (p)(1) of
this section and is made for services conducted for the benefit of that institution or entity and if the
alien has not accepted such payment or expenses from more than 5 institutions or organizations in
the previous 6-month period.").
99.
John Marshall, Author's Problems at U.S. Border May Signal Things to Come, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 1, 2004, 9:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/aelbooks/article/Author-s(quoting Jim McDermott, Washington State
problems-at-U-S-border-may-signal-l141231.php
Representative).
100.
Etter, supra note 24.
101.
LEGOMSKY & RODRiGUEZ, supra note 95, at 1293-95.
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removal is justified, and are decisions that are typically made and then
executed quickly-often in a matter of hours, if not minutes.1 0 2 Some
advocates have criticized the expansion of summary removal proceedings and suggest more cases should be referred to the immigration
courts. 0 3 Assuming Congress is unlikely to make such a change, it is
essential that the immigration officials making these determinations receive proper training. For example, the CBP official who concluded
Robert Lopez-Gutierrez could not have a valid asylum claim based on
his fear of harm from non-governmental actors had not been trained in
asylum law.i' If she had even a basic understanding of the subject, she
would have known that a person who expresses credible fear of harm
from private actors rather than the government nonetheless may have a
valid asylum claim that is worthy of exploration in a credible fear interview. 105 For those seeking asylum in the United States, the rights granted
to them by statute matter far less than the legal knowledge of those CBP
officials charged with making these crucial threshold determinations.
In addition, training should be accompanied by a change in interpretive approach. When immigration officials make determinations about
who may enter and remain in the United States, they should err on the
side of interpreting the law expansively, at least in those cases that do not
raise national security concerns. Courts have adopted a "rule of lenity"
favoring the noncitizen when interpreting ambiguous immigration statutes;106 immigration officials should do the same, particularly when they
are the sole adjudicator of an individual's claimed right to enter or remain in the United States. 0 7 The immigration enforcement system cannot eliminate all error, but it should seek to minimize errors that lead to
wrongful exclusion and deportation of those entitled to remain in the
United States.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This Article began by noting that although many immigration
scholars and advocates criticize the lack of procedural protections in immigration enforcement, there is very little data on the frequency or causes of such errors. The data on immigration enforcement errors described
in Part I is far from complete, and thus no definitive conclusions can be
§ 235,

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)

102.

See Immigration and Nationality Act

103.

See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 7-8.
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See id at 37-38.
See, e.g., Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007).

8 U.S.C.

(2013).

Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLaw After a Century of PlenaryPower: Phantom Consti106.
tutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 568 (1990) (describing the immigration rule of lenity as a means of "offset[ting] the disadvantaged position of aliens in constitutional
immigration law").
107.
Cf, Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1189, 1226 (2006) (asserting that the executive branch has an obligation to implement laws
to avoid encroachment of constitutional norms just as courts do and further noting that the obligation
is particularly strong when courts are not available to review executive action).
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drawn about how often immigration officials err and why they do so. Nor
would such a comprehensive data analysis be possible in the confines of
a symposium article. Accordingly, this Part sketches a framework for
future research and analysis and describes some challenges and issues
that such a project would entail.
A. Overcoming Secrecy
Immigration enforcement is disturbingly nontransparent, which can
both raise the risk of errors and make it difficult to identify and change
the practices that caused those mistakes.1os The lack of information about
detention and deportation of U.S. citizens provides a good example of
the problem. As Professor Stevens noted, DHS does not keep statistics
on the number of U.S. citizens that are detained and deported, and yet
DHS has claimed that such mistakes were rare. 0 9 After researching that
question, Stevens uncovered a significant number of errors, demonstrating that DHS is unaware of the scope of its most egregious errors.'10
Secrecy can be overcome in a number of ways. First, researchers
should seek out more information about immigration enforcement errors
through Freedom of Information Act requests, such as requests for documents from ICE and CBP in which those agencies admitted error in
targeting an individual for removal from the United States.'' In addition,
advocates can push the federal government to track and publicize its own
error rate. Congressional oversight is yet another method of forcing immigration officials to publicly disclose the frequency of their errors. Finally, immigration advocates should keep each other informed about
enforcement errors through listservs and other methods of data sharing,
which can be used by researchers to gain a more comprehensive picture
of these types of errors.
B. The Scope of the Project
Although it may be impossible to determine the full extent of immigration enforcement errors, even a partial picture would be helpful to
determining the causes of immigration enforcement errors. Scholars of

108.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 65, at 102 (criticizing immigration enforcement for its lack
of "accountability and transparency").
109.
See Stevens, supra note 14, at 618-19.

110.

See id at 620-21.
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AILA has recently filed suit against the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)
111.
seeking data on complaints filed against federal immigration judges, as well as information about
how EOIR responded to those complaints. AILA contends that EOIR is violating the Freedom of
Information Act by failing to proactively post online resolutions of complaints against federal immigration judges, and it explains that it has "sought public disclosure of the[se] records in light of
longstanding public concern that EOIR has failed to adequately investigate complaints against immigration judges and to take disciplinary action where appropriate." Memorandum of Points
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment & in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Exec. Office for Immigra-

tion Review, No. 13-cv-00840, 2014 WL 2776308 (D.D.C. June 16, 2014).
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the criminal justice system give widely varying estimates of the number
of wrongful convictions, and there appears to be no consensus as to
whether that number is closer to 1% or 20%.1 12 Nonetheless, Professor
Garrett's examination of several hundred cases in which individuals were
exonerated through DNA evidence has value because it shows where the
system repeatedly went wrong in cases in which innocence is no longer
questionable. Likewise, a similar study of a small subset of cases in
which immigration enforcement officers admitted error could shed light
on how those mistakes were made, and thus how to prevent them from
recurring in the future.
C. DrawingConclusionsfrom Data
The question at the heart of this Article is whether the error rate in
immigration enforcement is too high. No system of law enforcement can
ensure 100% accuracy, and thus errors are a necessary, albeit regrettable,
by-product of enforcing immigration laws. Thus, uncovering errors by
immigration enforcement officers does not prove that the costs of those
errors outweigh the benefits of enforcing immigration laws.
Nonetheless, systemic and preventable errors can never be justified
by any enforcement system, no matter how good its overall track record.
For example, if ICE is regularly deporting mentally ill and intellectually
disabled individuals who mistakenly "confess" to being undocumented
immigrants, then it should change its policies regarding its willingness to
rely on such statements as the primary basis for removal. If CBP officers' lack of knowledge of asylum law leads to frequent failures to recognize valid asylum claims, then CBP should improve its training. Even if
these errors are rare-and, as described in Part I.B., the available evidence suggests they happen with some frequency-they are preventable
and thus must stop.
CONCLUSION
Every system of enforcement and adjudication will commit errors,
no matter how many procedural protections are put in place. On occasion, an innocent person will be convicted, or an individual entitled to
remain in the United States will be deported. But these mistakes should
be rare. The criminal justice system incorporates heightened procedural
protections to minimize such errors, not only to protect the innocent, but
also to promote the legitimacy of the government's exercise of its criminal enforcement authority. Now that immigration law comes with many
of the penalties that accompany the criminal system, it is important to
minimize the error rate in this field as well. To do so, immigration reform advocates should follow the lead of advocates for reform in the
112.
Ramsey & Frank, supra note 6, at 440 ("Various studies have provided estimates of the
frequency of wrongful conviction ranging from .5% to as high as 20%.").
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criminal justice system who have used the data gathered from wrongful
convictions to seek new procedural protections in the enforcement of
criminal law. Only after obtaining a clearer picture of the number of
wrongful deportations that occur each year, and the reasons why they
occur, can we begin to address the causes of those errors.

